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Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda 
Julie Davies∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A fresh start in a game of cards requires us to reshuffle the deck. 
In so doing, we mix cards previously in play with new ones to 
approach the game from a new perspective. Although the current 
longstanding impasse over the U.S. health care system in general and 
the 46.6 million uninsured Americans in particular1 is no game, a 
reshuffling of the issues may open an opportunity to solve what 
seems to be an intractable problem. To date, it seems every political 
solution has been tried and has failed.2 In this Article, I argue that one 
way to gain political traction on the problem is to integrate the health 
care issue into the agenda for tort reform. At first blush, the issues 
may seem disconnected: recovery through the tort system is 
admittedly a narrower issue than health care access, affecting only 
those injured through tortious conduct of others. However, closer 
examination reveals connections between these topics as yet 
unrecognized by the groups with the strongest interests in them. 
Through a reshuffling that reveals these links and harnesses the 
political capital in the tort reform movement, the powerful interest 
groups that comprise the stakeholders in both debates may realize 
new benefits through solving the problems created by the 
inaccessibility of health care for the uninsured. At the same time, 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I benefited 
from the critiques of Professors Franklin Gevurtz, Greg Pingree, Amy Landers, Raymond 
Coletta, Larry Levine, Ned Spurgeon, and Elizabeth Weeks as well as the feedback of Dr. Julie 
E. Meyers. Thanks also to my research assistant, Bonnie Brown. 
 1. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & CHERYL HILL LEE, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-231, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 30 (2006) available at http://www. 
census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf. 
 2. See infra notes 18–33 and accompanying text. 
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resolution of this issue may make it easier to effectuate changes that 
lower the costs of the tort system. 
While real progress in achieving a solution to the health care mess 
has been elusive, tort reform3 is another story. Although tort reform 
has stagnated at the federal level,4 it has been implemented with a 
vengeance in many states.5 Members of the public and many elected 
officials see tort reform as a cure for a civil justice system that is 
unfair, out-of-control and extremely costly.6 The same adjectives 
 
 3. Tort reform generally refers to legislative proposals or enactments that modify the 
common law rules of torts. As professor Gary R. Smith observes, tort reform can also occur 
through judicial decisions, as it did when courts created defenses such as contributory 
negligence or the fellow servant rule. Gary R. Smith, The Future of Tort Reform: Reforming the 
Remedy, Re-balancing the Scales, 53 EMORY L.J. 1219 (2004). The first wave of legislative tort 
reform occurred in the late 1800s in Germany and the United Kingdom and in 1910 in the 
United States, when workers’ compensation legislation was enacted in New York. Id. at 1220. 
The second wave occurred in the 1970s, when automobile no-fault legislation was adopted in 
numerous states. Id. The later waves of tort reform in the 1970s through 1990s have addressed 
medical malpractice and product liability and virtually all have had the effect of reducing 
plaintiffs’ access to the courts. Id. 
 4. President Bush has called for medical liability reform in numerous State of the Union 
messages. In 2007 he has asked Congress for action to “curb junk lawsuits.” George W. Bush, 
President of the United States, 2007 State of the Union Address, available at http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/16672456/page/2/. He made the same appeal in the 2006 State of the Union, 
George W. Bush, President of the United States, 2006 State of the Union Address, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/31/sotu.transcript/index.html, and again in 2004, 
when he urged elimination of “wasteful and frivolous medical lawsuits.” George W. Bush, 
President of the United States, 2004 State of the Union Address, available at http.www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. Former Majority Leader Bill Frist 
blamed the cost of health care on the medical liability system and on trial lawyers in particular. 
Bill Frist, Remarks at 2004 Republican Convention, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/articles/A50446-2004Aug31.html. Despite Frist’s interest in making this a 
legislative priority, no medical reform legislation was submitted to President Bush for 
signature. In 1995, Congress sent a bill to President Clinton containing limited reforms, but the 
President vetoed it. The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(2005) is the only significant tort reform legislation that has been enacted into law. Congress 
believed that state court class actions were overly generous and that they were hurting 
American business interests. The resulting statute gave federal courts more original and 
removal jurisdiction over class actions. The statute is so complex that, in the view of one group 
of casebook authors, it will require at least a decade to interpret it in the courts. THOMAS D. 
ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 2006 SUPPLEMENT 14–15. 
 5. See MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND 
ALTERNATIVES 813 (8th ed. 2006). For an excellent and current database cataloguing tort 
reform in effect in the states, see Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 6. Studies indicate that the public relations campaign of politicians and other tort reform 
proponents has affected the public perception that the civil justice system is out of control and 
that injured plaintiffs do not deserve compensation. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/8
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apply to the U.S. health care system, and the same players are 
affected by it. Would it be possible to capitalize on the eagerness for 
tort reform and the political ability to accomplish it to find solutions 
to the broader issues of health care accessibility? 
Although tort reform legislation is not limited to the medical 
malpractice issue, it is undeniable that much of the political impetus 
for reform has been spurred by the perception that tort law is hurting 
doctors and the delivery of health care.7 The irony of this premise is 
that some tort reform legislation itself appears to worsen access to 
health care for America’s uninsured, a group that comprises 
approximately 16% of the population,8 as well as the much greater 
 
Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice 
System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 640 (2006) (citing studies indicating that there is a high level 
of public support for limits on pain and suffering, and a fairly high level of support for general 
limits on medical malpractice actions). Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success 
of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact that 
it has had is Between People’s Ears: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 
DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000). There are studies indicating Americans are not particularly 
litigious as compared with people in other countries. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, 
Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1085, 1086–87 (2006) (discussing several empirical and comparative studies).  
 7. In a speech given in January 2005 in Collinsville, Illinois, President Bush mounted a 
podium in front of an audience of cheering doctors in white coats and a banner that read 
“affordable health care.” He announced, “I’m here to talk about how we need to fix a broken 
medical liability system.” Other comments included, “lawyers are filing baseless suits against 
hospitals and doctors . . . . They know the medical liability system is tilted in their favor.” 
Professor Tom Baker describes and quotes the speech, offering it as an example of an 
“effective, succinct, and powerful statement of the medical malpractice myth.” TOM BAKER, 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 12–13 (2005). The White House website continues to list 
medical liability reforms as a key to the President’s affordable health care agenda. The White 
House, http//www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/healthcare (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). See also 
Paul C. Weiler, Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—And Ethical—
Fashion, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 205, 205–08 (2005) (describing malpractice’s role as a central 
issue in the political arena). 
 8. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a 
More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2005). These numbers do not 
include people who have limited and inadequate access to care due to issues involving coverage 
type or ability to pay. Although we think of insurance as tied to employment in the United 
States, a “sizeable minority” of jobs do not provide health insurance. Id. at 17. Employees not 
offered health care tend to be more likely to be low-income, part-time, minority, female, or 
under thirty. Id. at 18. Eighty percent of uninsured Americans are employed or live within a 
household where someone is employed. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System 
and How to Fix It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 540 
(2006). Health insurance is unavailable to the people in worst health who are not aligned within 
a large group, such as pools of employees, and it is very expensive. Id. at 41. According to a 
report recently released, the number of individuals without health insurance rose from 15.5% in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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number who periodically lack coverage, are underinsured, or lack 
coverage for long-term disabilities. These individuals are forced to 
rely on the tort system for their medical needs when they are injured 
by the torts of others. This is an expensive and inefficient way to 
obtain medical care, but many of these individuals have no other 
choice. Litigation is generated when they are forced to sue to obtain 
the treatment and care necessary to restore them to health. Once they 
sue, tort reform legislation makes it less likely they will be made 
whole, and more likely that they must rely on public benefits,9 use 
emergency rooms for basic care,10 or delay return to the workforce.11 
Although physicians and other interest groups want tort reform, 
 
2004 to 15.9% in 2005. The proportion of people covered by employment-based health 
insurance decreased between 2004 and 2005 from 59.8% to 59.5%. U.S. blacks and Hispanics 
are uninsured at higher percentages than non-Hispanic whites. The percentage and number of 
children in poverty increased from 10.8% to 11.2%. Children in poverty are more likely to be 
uninsured than other children, with a reported rate of 19%. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1, at 
21. For a sense of who the uninsured are, and why they are uninsured, see Profiles of the 
Uninsured, available at http://www.cmwf.org/General/General_show.htm?doc_id=256036 (last 
visited July 10, 2006) (the stories of 120 uninsured men and women interviewed by a physician 
and an anthropologist). 
 9. Federal and state sponsored insurance in the form of Medicare and Medicaid assists 
people with disabilities. Medicare provides health insurance benefits to people over age sixty-
five as well as to younger people with a statutorily specified chronic disability. The Medicaid 
program was established in 1965 as a companion to Medicare and focuses on the poorest 
segments of the population—single parents with dependent children and the aged, disabled, and 
blind. Nonetheless, only 40% of those deemed “poor” under federal poverty guidelines are 
covered by Medicaid, only 21% of the near poor, and only 20% of the people with severe 
disabilities. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KEY MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/key% 
20Medicare%20and%20Medicaid%20Statistics.pdf. Disability benefits are also available from 
Social Security, although the requirements to qualify are very strict. Disability Benefits, 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10029.html#part1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). 
 10. The uninsured are often treated in emergency rooms, which, by law, must provide care 
without promise of reimbursement. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(“EMTALA”), Consolidated Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003 and Supp. 2006)), 
imposes a duty to provide treatment, and was enacted in response to widespread reports of 
patient-dumping. Hospitals were reportedly sending the indigent and uninsured away to charity 
hospitals without even cursory examination. The costs associated with EMTALA are 
significant: In 1998, total direct expense for physician services to the uninsured approached $1 
billion, and hospital facility costs were around $2 billion. See Elizabeth Weeks, After the 
Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for Hospitals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 223, 234–38 (2006). 
 11. The uninsured receive fewer services than the insured as they navigate emergency 
rooms and make ad hoc arrangements for care. They get less preventive care, and are diagnosed 
later than the insured. JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS 231–32 
(2005). 
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implementing reforms that exacerbate the obstacles to return to health 
and employment for a subgroup of plaintiffs is counterproductive.12 
The adverse effects of tort reform legislation on the uninsured that 
are discussed here affect other discrete groups similarly,13 but I focus 
on the uninsured for several reasons. First, the group of uninsured is 
broad, cutting across the other groups and including a very diverse 
segment of society. Second, the focus on this large group’s status as 
lacking access to health care and its resulting reliance on the tort 
system for medical and long-term care relate to the most fundamental 
purposes of the tort system. Third, it is by looking at the nexus 
between tort reform, the uninsured, and the health care problems that 
plague the U.S. that interest groups that are currently unallied might 
be brought into some agreement to begin working in the same 
direction.  
The current course of the debate about tort reform is too narrow to 
allow a genuine discussion and resolution of the problem of health 
care accessibility. Tort reform issues have been spun narrowly to 
justify approaches that are desirable to some groups but not 
necessarily good from a policy standpoint. The highly politicized 
character of the discussion has placed wedges between groups that 
should be natural allies, such as consumers and physicians. From a 
policy standpoint, society seems to be caught between the “Scylla” of 
maintaining an inefficient system out of concern for the medical 
needs of a minority of the population, and the “Charybdis” of 
modifying the system without regard to those who need it most.14 
 
 12. As one scholar frames the question, there is an “undiscussed public policy issue [as to] 
whether taxpayers should bear the burden of medical malpractice.” Neil Vidmar, Medical 
Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The Contingency Fee System, Juries, and 
Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1220 (2005). Of course, the issue is broader than 
taxpayer payment for malpractice injuries, and includes all tort related injuries for which 
plaintiffs are forced to rely on public benefits for care. 
 13. It has also been argued that tort reform proposals have a significant adverse impact on 
women and the elderly, and a disparate impact on cases involving death, especially the death of 
a child from medical malpractice. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: 
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1265 (2004), and that racism plays a 
huge unstated role in the operation of the tort system, recognition of which should be taken into 
account in tort reform proposals. Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: 
Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761 (1996). See supra note 8 for data 
regarding the presence of racial minorities and women among the uninsured. 
 14. Charybdis was a whirlpool off the coast of Sicily personified in Greek myth as a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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For these reasons, the tort reform agenda should be merged with 
the issue of health care for the uninsured, producing a much broader 
and more imaginative debate and ultimately, new legislative 
solutions. The hope is that by broadening the discourse, some key 
stakeholders will begin to realize that finding a solution serves their 
own interests and furthers the common good.15 If we face the fact that 
uninsured Americans are forced by need to seek de facto health 
coverage through the tort system when they are injured and that the 
current framework of federal laws serving the poor is inadequate to 
remove the pressure on the system,16 it should become easier to see 
the need for a solution.  
To be clear, I am not advocating wholesale replacement of the tort 
system with a no-fault plan; I continue to see much value, in terms of 
corrective justice, deterrence, and the righting of wrongs in the tort 
system.17 Rather, I am suggesting that, by examining the linkage 
between tort reform and the uninsured, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the flaws in our health system and our reliance on 
the tort system to provide coverage emerges. With newfound clarity, 
perhaps the political gridlock that plagues the system can be broken 
and solutions that represent moderate, rational, and effective public 
policy as to health care access and the costs of the tort system can be 
developed. 
 
female monster, while Scylla was a nymph who terrorized mariners in the same area by 
changing into a monster. Mariners navigating between Scylla and Charybdis were faced with 
two equally hazardous and undesirable alternatives. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 228, 1057 (1983). 
 15. See infra notes 150–80 and accompanying text. 
 16. Jost, supra note 8, at 556–73. Half of the cost of health care in the United States is 
paid by public insurance programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, public hospitals, and through 
the cost of tax subsidies provided to finance private health insurance. Id. 
 17. John Goldberg argues compensation and deterrence are not the primary goals and that 
the tort system is best theorized as “a special kind of victims’ rights law.” John C. P. Goldberg, 
What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory’s Place in Debates over Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. 
L. REV. 1075, 1077–78 (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/8
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II. THE TORT REFORM AGENDA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 
UNINSURED 
To explore the validity of the assertion that tort reform hurts 
uninsured individuals who must use the tort system for medical and 
other care expenses when they are injured through negligence or 
other torts, it is essential to discuss specific features of tort reform 
legislation. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to realize that the 
current silence about the intersection of tort reform and health care 
access issues did not always exist. Fifteen years ago, when universal 
health care seemed likely, scholars were contemplating the changes 
to the tort system that could and should result from its enactment. 
A. Thoughts from the Clinton Years 
When Bill Clinton was first elected President, one of the first 
issues he sought to tackle was health care reform.18 He was 
concerned not only about cost containment, but also about the 
devastating impact of the high cost of medical services on those 
without medical insurance.19 There appeared to be bipartisan support 
for some change in the direction of universal coverage.20 Perhaps this 
was overly optimistic given the fact that universal health care had 
been seriously debated through much of the twentieth century but 
never had come to fruition through the legislative process.21 Many 
 
 18. PHILLIP FUNIGIELLO, CHRONIC POLITICS, HEALTH CARE FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. 
BUSH 218–19 (2005) (recounting Clinton’s pledge to make universal medical coverage a major 
public policy initiative of his first hundred days and explaining the poor political environment 
for such a major change). 
 19. Id. Annual medical costs were approaching a trillion dollars and nearly 40 million 
Americans lacked insurance by choice or by necessity. Id. 
 20. Id. at 249–53. The issue was one that had engaged public attention during the 
campaign. In October of 1993, two Republicans, John Cooper of Tennessee and Fred Grandy of 
Iowa, had introduced a bipartisan managed-care bill that was co-sponsored by twenty-six 
Democrats and eighteen Republicans. Ultimately, leaders in the Democratic and Republican 
parties viewed compromise as undesirable and the Republican leadership saw Clinton’s health 
care initiative as a way to portray the administration as big-spending liberals. Although Senate 
Democratic leader Mitchell and House Democratic leader Gephardt tried to introduce rescue 
bills that would attract bipartisan support, and although these bills were far less bureaucratic 
and intrusive than Clinton’s plan, the momentum was gone by August of 1994. Id. at 255–56. 
 21. JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO NATIONAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE (2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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theories explain why universal health care initiatives have failed in 
the past: opposition to big government; the absence of a strong 
political labor party; racial politics that for the first two-thirds of the 
century led to opposition to any government intrusion out of fear it 
would lead to intervention on racial practices; and the political 
structure of the United States, both nationally and at the state level.22 
Professor Jill Quadagno makes a powerful case that none of these 
theories really accounts for our failure to provide universal health 
care, although all may play a role. Instead, she argues, “we have 
failed to grasp how much we have ceded our health care to private 
interests.”23 
The story of Clinton’s failure is illustrative of the role those 
private interests played in opposing health care reform as well as how 
a President who won only 43% of the vote failed to mobilize against 
those interests in timely fashion. Eleven days after Clinton took 
office, the Health Insurance Association of America hired the ranking 
Republican on the House Committee on Ways and Means, Bill 
Gradison, as its president and chief lobbyist, and the group 
immediately began to raise money and run ads questioning 
government involvement in health care.24 Attack ads began to run, 
including the famous “Harry and Louise” spot, which featured a 
husband and wife who sat around the table worrying about having to 
use a health plan picked by “bureaucrats” and planting the suspicion 
that this was just an excuse to expand big government.25 The Health 
Insurance Association then organized a coalition to enlist local 
business leaders in opposing Clinton’s plan.26 Although initially there 
was some support for health care reform from some insurance 
companies, they eventually endorsed managed competition as a 
solution and ultimately turned against the Clinton plan.27 
Manufacturers with large retiree benefit commitments, such as the 
auto industry, had initially supported Clinton’s plan but later reversed 
their position because they were satisfied that managed care could 
 
 22. Id. at 6–16. 
 23. Id. at 16. 
 24. Id. at 189. 
 25. Id. at 189–90. 
 26. Id. at 190. 
 27. QUADAGNO, supra note 21, at 190. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/8
p 119 Davies book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda 127 
 
 
contain costs.28 Drug companies feared the regulation of prices and 
opposed the plan.29 Small businesses, mobilized by the National 
Federation of Independent Business, joined the opposition fearing a 
high tax burden and in turn deluged members of Congress with their 
disapproval.30 The American Medical Association (“AMA”), which 
had long been the strongest voice against universal health care,31 was 
not as active in this fight and physician groups splintered, with some 
organizations supporting health care reform and others opposing it.32 
Thus, physicians failed to speak with a strong and united voice about 
their views on health care reform. The media blitz and money poured 
into fueling the opposition caused public approval of a national health 
system to decline from 67% when first announced by Clinton to 44% 
by February 1994. This decline is credited with enabling the 
Republican Party to take control of the House of Representatives on 
an anti-big government platform in the 1994 election.33 
Given this history of failure, one might wonder why professor 
Gary Schwartz, a luminary in the field of torts, predicted in 1992 that, 
by the end of the century, the United States would adopt a national 
health care program.34 His sense was that a broad consensus had 
emerged among “Democrats and Republicans alike, that it is awful to 
face, without insurance, the massive bills produced by modern 
medicine, and even more awful for Americans to be denied health 
care because of a lack of insurance or wealth.”35 Although by the 
time his article was published in 1994, Clinton’s plan was dead, 
Schwartz was still optimistic enough to write a piece about the 
 
 28. Id. at 191. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. As Drs. Richmond and Fein recount the history of the AMA, the last time it spoke in 
favor of health insurance for the population was 1917. There were physicians who deviated 
from the AMA’s view, including a distinguished committee that in 1937 forwarded a statement 
of principles and proposals for a national health policy, but they were publicly attacked by the 
AMA and eventually the group disbanded. The AMA thwarted Harry Truman’s plan for 
national health insurance. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 11 at 12–22. 
 32. QUADAGNO, supra note 21, at 192.  
 33. Id. at 194. 
 34. Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What its Effect Would be on 
American Tort and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339 (1994). 
 35. Id. at 1339. 
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impact of national health insurance on tort law.36 Other noted 
scholars joined the debate, including professor Jeffrey O’Connell, 
who predicted that the availability of health insurance would increase 
tort suits.37 O’Connell, long a champion of no-fault plans, urged that 
federal health insurance reform should be coupled with auto 
insurance reform that would offer motorists the option of being paid 
promptly for unreimbursed out-of-pocket losses on a no-fault basis 
and the right to opt out of suing and being sued for pain and 
suffering.38 O’Connell also would have reformed other personal 
injury claims by offering defendants the choice of eliminating pain 
and suffering when an offer is made to pay periodically for an injured 
party’s actual economic losses, plus a reduced claimant’s attorney’s 
fee.39 Professors Ken Abrams and Lance Liebman commented on the 
need to perceive the relationships between tort law and private and 
social insurance systems and to develop reform proposals that take 
into account these various systems.40 These were bold visions that 
looked at the tort system as part of a larger whole and resisted the 
temptation to focus exclusively on one issue, such as medical 
malpractice. 
As it became clear that the Clinton plan and any offshoots were 
dead, torts scholars tended to concentrate on tort reform41 and health 
and policy scholars continued to write about whether universal health 
care would be desirable and what it would look like if implemented.42 
There is some life left in the debate about universal health care, as 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jeffrey O’Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A 
Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303 (1994).  
 38. Id. at 1310. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance and Tort 
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 
(1993). 
 41. See, e.g., Symposium, Who Feels Their Pain? The Challenge of Noneconomic 
Damages in Civil Litigation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 249–792 (2006); Symposium, Starting Over?: 
Redesigning the Medical Malpractice System, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 203–655 (2005); 
Symposium, The Future of Tort Reform: Reforming the Remedy, Re-balancing the Scales, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1220 (2004). 
 42. See, e.g., Symposium, Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (2006); 
Symposium, National Health Reform and America’s Uninsured, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 386, 
386–473 (2004). 
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evidenced by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requiring it.43 
California has passed legislation only to have it vetoed by Governor 
Schwarzenegger,44 but he has now proposed his own plan to remake 
health care.45 Most of the public debate about health care accessibility 
and cost has centered on other government programs such as Social 
Security and prescription drug coverage.46 Legal scholarship about 
tort reform is broad and thorough in its attention to a wide array of 
issues; however, tort reform issues, as reflected in states’ legislation 
and presented in the public domain, are narrow and “fueled by the 
economic self-interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely 
affected by the tort system.”47  
Acknowledging a debt to the scholarly insights of Schwartz and 
others, it is time to revisit the issue they were concerned about from 
the opposite angle. That is, rather than considering what the effect of 
national health insurance on the tort system is likely to be, we need to 
analyze the wisdom and effectiveness of enacting tort reform without 
dealing with losses caused by the lack of health insurance and other 
social support. In the present state of political gridlock, our choices 
 
 43. Daniel Weintraub, Commentary, Taking First Steps Toward Health Coverage for All, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 15, 2006, at B7 (describing the bipartisan compromise that was 
enacted in Massachusetts in 2006).  
 44. California State Senator Sheila Kuehl carried a bill that would have provided every 
Californian with coverage under a single payer plan with choice of doctor and the legislature 
passed it, but the governor vetoed it. Frank D. Russo, Schwarzenegger Announces Veto of 
Universal Health Care Bill SB 840, CAL. PROGRESS REP., Sept. 5, 2006, available at 
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2006/09/schwarzenegger_21.html. 
 45. M. Gregg Bloche, It’s Up to You: The Governor’s Healthcare Plan Would Reward the 
Fit with Lower Premiums, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at 3. Professor Bloche describes the 
California governor’s plan as relying on “an elaborate scheme of subsidies from employers, 
doctors, hospitals, and the federal government,” but its signature item is people’s responsibility 
for their own health. He states that the “radical promise” of the plan is its potential to move 
beyond the metaphor of a handout toward the idea that health is an “individual and common 
duty.” The proposal bears some similarity to one forwarded by Senator John Chafee in 1994, 
which would have required individuals to buy coverage. Republicans initially supported Chafee 
but ultimately concluded there was greater political benefit in defeating health care reform 
entirely. Id. 
 46. For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has called for urgent reforms 
of Medicare and Social Security, predicting that absent quick action, there will need to be tax 
increases, deep cuts in benefits, cuts in other federal programs, and an increase in national debt. 
Kevin G. Hall, Fed Chief: Quickly Reform Medicare, Social Security, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 
5, 2006, at D3. 
 47. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 654 (1990) (reviewing 
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)). 
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are limited, inefficient, and potentially unfair. We can try to constrain 
the costs of tort liability through piecemeal reforms without regard to 
how such reforms adversely affect the uninsured, or we can retain the 
common law rules without reform so that we protect that subgroup of 
uninsured persons who become plaintiffs in tort cases and rely on the 
tort system for the health care they need to return to the status quo. 
But, neither is a wise choice from a public policy standpoint. What is 
needed, rather, is a way to reframe the debate and reengage the 
stakeholders in thoughtful dialogue. 
At the present time, with terrorism, war, illegal immigration, and 
other pressing issues competing for the federal dollar, national health 
insurance may seem unlikely. The powerful political barriers that 
make national health insurance particularly difficult to enact remain 
strong,48 as do the powerful interest groups that have opposed it. 
Nonetheless, the issue has been raised by 2008 presidential hopefuls 
who have indicated it would be part of their agenda if elected.49 The 
cost of delivering medical care and the impact of uninsured persons 
remain relevant at the federal and state levels, as does an interest in 
cutting costs that are added to medical care by the inefficiency of the 
tort system. We owe it to ourselves and to coming generations to 
think through these issues in a comprehensive fashion. 
B. Exposing Some Preliminary Assumptions About Tort Reform 
Given the amount of tort reform that already has been enacted by 
states and the ongoing pressure to enact more, it appears there are 
many who take the first option set forth above: “fix” perceived 
problems of the tort system in piecemeal fashion without regard to 
 
 48. Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health Insurance: 
Progressive Lessons from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 208 (describing 
barriers created by the political system). The internal organization of Congress, its fragmented 
structure and weak political parties, and the divergent individual agendas of members of 
Congress make reform extremely difficult. Id. 
 49. Nedra Pickler, Obama Calls for Universal Health Care, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 25, 
2007, available at http://dwb.sacbee.com/24hour/politics/v-print/story/3481911p-12730042c. 
html. Senator Barack Obama indicated he expected universal health coverage would be in effect 
by the end of the next President’s first term. Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton and former 
Senator John Edwards have also promised to offer plans. Id. 
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the impact on the uninsured.50 I will explore the problems with that 
approach with attention to particular pieces of the tort reform agenda 
but first address some premises and assumptions that underlie tort 
reform generally. 
Although there is enormous substantive and procedural diversity 
in the tort reform that has been enacted, there is commonality in its 
premise. Most tort reform is designed to minimize the number of 
personal injury actions that are filed or to mitigate the damages that 
would be paid in a settlement or an eventual trial. The assumption, 
based on that premise, is that lower numbers of tort actions mean a 
lower risk of litigation and high payouts, which should have the 
effect of lessening the costs of liability insurance.51 The beneficiaries 
of reform legislation—businesses, medical practitioners, or the 
insurance industry itself—should see cost savings and the intangible, 
psychic benefits of less litigation. In theory, these benefits would then 
be passed along to the ultimate consumers of various services and the 
American economy generally. 
In fact, many studies and articles that question every one of the 
assumptions made in the paragraph above. The literature is so 
voluminous that full exposition here is impossible, but several points 
are key. First, many scholars do not agree that the tort system is 
“broken” and needs to be fixed through tort reform.52 They dispute 
the underlying data and its interpretation by tort reform proponents.53 
 
 50. See Finley, supra note 13, at 1264–66 (arguing that the proponents of caps on 
noneconomic damages have given “little or no thought” to their effects on the ability of the 
injured to find lawyers and gain access to the justice system, and arguing that, in addition to 
being ineffective to control insurance rates, caps on noneconomic damages have a disparate 
impact on women and the elderly and in wrongful death cases). 
 51. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1094 (2000) (noting that critics believe 
Americans are lawsuit-prone and greedy, and that they sue for every little injury, driving up the 
cost of insurance or even making it unavailable and that lawsuits drive useful products from the 
market). 
 52. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 139, 172 (1996) (defending the common law’s focus on individualized justice for the 
particular plaintiff and arguing that tort reform proposals will undercut it); BAKER, supra note 
7, at 68–117 (analyzing research that indicates jurors do not favor medical malpractice plaintiffs 
and do a good job in assessing medical malpractice damages and if biased at all, are biased in 
favor of doctors, and that without malpractice lawsuits, people would not know about the extent 
of medical mistakes or injuries). He argues malpractice suits improve patient safety in addition 
to providing needed compensation. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 13, at 1270–80 (citing various studies that suggest the 
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As Anthony Sebok recently noted, “any discussion about civil 
litigation in America is treacherous because we have so little solid 
statistical data.”54 Michael Saks documented the lack of reliable data 
in a seminal piece in 1992.55 To the extent one questions or 
contradicts the assumption that tort judgments are responsible for 
adverse economic impacts on certain groups, such as doctors, the 
entire premise of tort reform is undercut.56 In his recent book, 
professor Tom Baker characterized the frenzy about medical 
malpractice suits as a “myth” that is part of a larger story that is told 
about “the litigation explosion, the litigiousness of Americans, and 
the debilitating effect that lawsuits have on the U.S. economy.”57 
Even if one gives credence to data indicating the existence of 
increased claim rates and payout amounts, it still does not necessarily 
follow that the system needs reform. As Professor Sebok notes in the 
context of noneconomic damages, it is premature to view those 
increases as symptomatic of a problem until we understand how they 
came about.58  
The other assumption implicit in discussions of tort reform is that 
its various revisions of the common law actually work as intended. In 
fact, we lack dispositive evidence that tort reform legislation is 
causally responsible for lower rates of litigation or lower premiums59 
 
empirical reality is the complete opposite of the way it is portrayed by tort reform proponents); 
PAGE, supra note 47, at 649 (1990) (describing anecdotes supporting tort reform as untrue). 
 54. Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering 
Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 381 (2006).  
 55. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992). 
 56. Many attribute insurance premium increases to reduced investment income in a slow 
economy. See DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1095–96. 
 57. BAKER, supra note 7, at 1–14. Baker’s views are based on numerous empirical studies 
and are supported by other scholars. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 6, at 1094 (discussing 
Baker’s study and a subsequent study that strongly supports his views). 
 58. See Sebok, supra note 54, at 383. Sebok considers possible reasons why noneconomic 
damages may have risen faster than economic damages. He offers the possibility that more 
women, minorities, and working-class people have been brought into the tort system through an 
innovative bar or changes in civil procedure, and given the gendered quality of noneconomic 
damages, the numbers may reflect their inclusion. Id. at 385–86. If this scenario is true, then it 
may be a reflection of a healthier and fairer civil justice system instead of a system gone awry. 
 59. A report issued in 2003 by the independent financial analyst Weiss Ratings Inc. 
concluded that while damage caps produce a 15.7% reduction in median insurer payouts, they 
do not cause insurance companies to reduce the premiums they charge doctors, and in fact, that 
caps may be inversely correlated to medical malpractice premium levels. MARTIN D. WEISS ET 
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when it is enacted and indeed, there is fairly strong evidence that 
much tort reform does not result in its intended effect.60 For example, 
a symposium addressing possible improvements to medical 
malpractice insurance61 included two articles that discussed the 
effects of California’s MICRA legislation, some provisions of which 
were viewed as models for proposed federal legislation. One writer 
attributed decreases in medical malpractice insurance premiums to 
the enactment of MICRA,62 while another argued that California’s 
increased regulation of the insurance industry at exactly the same 
time was responsible.63 There is considerable scholarship attributing 
pricing of medical malpractice insurance to the cyclical nature of the 
insurance industry’s underwriting cycle.64 
For purposes of this Article, I will assume that, in fact, some tort 
reform measures can and actually do decrease the number of claims 
and the cost of settlements or judgments.65 Thus, those who stand to 
benefit from tort reform are not likely to abandon their agenda based 
 
AL., WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NONECONOMIC 
DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND THE AVAILABILITY 
OF COVERAGE 7–13 (2003), available at http://www.weissratings.com/medicalmalpractice.pdf. 
 60. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 6, at 642–43 (summarizing the connection 
between caps and insurance rates and finding a mixed picture). The Center of Justice & 
Democracy, an organization with a pro-trial-lawyers agenda, provides numerous examples 
where insurance rates have risen dramatically following enactment of caps. CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, CAPS DON’T WORK, available at http://www.centerjd.org/free/ 
mythbusters-free/MB_CapsDontWork.htm.  
 61. Symposium, Case Study Question, How Can the Current State of Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Be Improved?, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 341 (2005). 
 62. Donald J. Palmisano, Health Care in Crisis, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
371, 379 (2005) (strongly endorsing California’s MICRA legislation as the model to pursue to 
fix the medical liability crisis). 
 63. Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises 
Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 369 (2005). 
 64. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005) (discussing the factors that contribute to the underwriting cycle 
generally, as well as risks that make medical malpractice insurance particularly likely to be 
influenced by pressures of the underwriting cycle and reviewing other studies on the topic). 
 65. For empirical research indicating that some reforms have affected claim frequency and 
severity, and thus premiums, see PATRICIA DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: RESEARCH RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1982); the 
American Association of Tort Reform certainly takes the view that tort reform works, touting 
successes in Texas, Mississippi, and New Jersey, among others, on its website. See American 
Association of Tort Reform, How Tort Reform Works, http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/ 
7964_howworks.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). 
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on statistical inaccuracy, unavailability of better data, lack of 
causality, or even the proposition that increases in claiming rates or 
judgments are actually salutary because they deter unsafe practices.66  
C. Dissecting the Tort Reform Agenda 
Although there is enormous variety in both the issues addressed 
and the approaches taken in state tort reform legislation,67 some 
attributes of the tort system are the focus of particular attention across 
jurisdictions. Noneconomic, or general damages are frequently 
criticized because these are seen as intangible and, hence, extremely 
difficult for jurors to value, leading to inflation and wide variability.68 
A common means of curbing these damages is to impose caps, such 
as $250,000 in any malpractice suit filed in California.69 These caps 
have a much more significant impact on the uninsured, as well as the 
poor generally, than is readily apparent. Although punitive damages 
are also viewed as problematic, both because they are unpredictable 
and because they raise the settlement value of a case, their rarity70 
and the fact that they supplement compensatory damages minimize 
the relevance of their reform as a burden on the uninsured. Joint and 
 
 66. BAKER, supra note 7, at 94–117 (arguing that medical malpractice claims are far less 
numerous than actual malpractice that occurs in society and that malpractice lawsuits improve 
patient safety). Baker illustrates this principle by referring to the example of anesthesiologists, 
who have responded to high premiums and malpractice claims by identifying unsafe practices, 
and developing new equipment and procedures to reduce injury. Id. 
 67. For a comprehensive analysis of major legal reforms of the 1970s and 1980s affecting 
medical malpractice, including insurance reforms, reforms aimed at improving medical quality, 
and tort reforms, see Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further 
Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 542 (1989). 
 68. Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Fall on Deaf Ears?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 490 
(2006). Empical research substantiates the variability of noneconomic awards. See, e.g., Randall 
R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. 
L. REV. 908, 923, 941 n.156 (1989); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and 
Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989). 
 69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).  
 70. There is a perception that punitive damages are awarded frequently, but empirical 
studies do not support this. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judges, Juries and Punitive 
Damages, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002) (finding no evidence judges and juries react 
differently in awarding punitive damages and finding that punitive damages are awarded less 
frequently in products liability cases than in intentional tort and employment cases); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 623 (1997) (punitive 
damages awarded in less than 10% of jury trials, with a median award of $50,000 and a mean of 
$534,000).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/8
p 119 Davies book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda 135 
 
 
several liability,71 however, has been the focus of major legislative 
change72 and remains an important issue in terms of delivering full 
compensation to plaintiffs. Although it may seem counterintuitive, 
reform of the collateral source rule, which in its common law form 
created the possibility that a plaintiff may recover twice for the same 
injuries,73 is also relevant, at least as an illustration of how 
complicated reform is when the pool of plaintiffs includes both 
insured individuals with many collateral sources and uninsured 
individuals with few.74 Tort reform of attorneys’ fees is also 
common, the theory being that a contingent fee may skew lawyers’ 
incentives to litigate.75 This too has dramatic effects on plaintiffs’ 
ability to obtain representation, which particularly hurts those who 
must use the legal system to be made whole. Finally, certain statutes, 
such as the Class Action Fairness Act,76 seek to reform the tort 
system by changing procedures that are believed to contribute to 
 
 71. Joint and several liability is a doctrine that protects the plaintiff from the risk of a 
defendant’s insolvency by providing in the terms of the judgment that each co-defendant is 
responsible for the entire amount. While not all tort judgments impose joint and several 
liability, it is very common because one of the grounds for doing so is the occurrence of an 
indivisible injury. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 413. 
 72. About a dozen states have abolished the doctrine, and another dozen have abolished it 
when the defendant is less than a certain percentage at fault. Several states, such as California, 
retain joint and several liability for economic damages and abolish it for noneconomic damages. 
Some retain the doctrine only when the plaintiff is not at fault. Others retain the doctrine but 
reallocate the percentage share of insolvent defendants to the other parties in the case in 
proportion to their fault. Some retain the doctrine for cases falling within certain subject areas 
and abolish it elsewhere. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 372.  
 73. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1058–59 (explaining that in many instances the collateral 
source rule only operates to protect an insurer’s subrogation rights, and in these instances, it is 
sometimes justified to prevent insurance premiums from rising). 
 74. In California malpractice actions, if all or a part of a victim’s medical bills have been 
paid by the victim’s own insurance or some source unrelated to the defendant, the jury will be 
informed. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1. Some states handle the issue as a matter of law. For 
example, New York will deduct money already received from most collateral insurance 
sources, but the plaintiff will receive credit for having paid up to two years’ premiums. 
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 784. 
 75. For example, the American Tort Reform Association expresses the opinion that 
contingent fees give attorneys incentives to seek cases that can be settled easily with little work 
or can be decided under no-fault laws. American Tort Reform Association, Contingent Fee 
Reform, http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7354. California has addressed this issue 
by modifying the traditional contingent fee structure in its MICRA legislation. CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (West 2003) (sliding fee scale in medical malpractice cases).  
 76. See supra note 4.  
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excessive litigation or other abuses of the system,77 but in the process 
may make it harder for people of less means to recover for injuries. 
1. Limitations on Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees 
Depending on one’s view, contingent fee financing of tort 
litigation is either the key to allowing people without means access to 
the legal system or the cause of many of the perceived ills of the tort 
system.78 This highly controversial yet common way of compensating 
plaintiffs’ attorneys continues to prompt many objections, including 
that it is unethical for an attorney to have a vested interest in the 
amount of a client’s recovery, that it promotes litigation of cases that 
are not likely winners but which may lead to a grudging settlement, 
and that attorneys are overpaid relative to the time they invest.79 It is 
tolerated, notwithstanding these objections, because it is a means of 
promoting access to justice even for people who lack the means to 
pay an hourly rate.80 Although there is a possibility of overpayment 
in a given case, an attorney’s caseload is viewed as a whole, with 
recognition of the risk of non-payment in other cases.81  
Tort reform legislation addresses the contingent fee in several 
ways, including requiring the court to determine the fee,82 and 
imposing a ceiling on fees,83 requiring court approval of fees,84 or by 
 
 77. Other hurdles in the same vein include shortening the statute of limitations, imposing 
preconditions to suit, and raising the burden of proof. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1071.  
 78. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, CONTINGENT FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004). 
 79. Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee 
Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 952–54 (1990); Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort 
Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 179–80 (2001). 
 80. Inselbuch, supra note 79, at 178. The contingent fee evens a victim’s odds of a fair 
recovery against tort defendants, who, unlike the plaintiff, are able to spread the risk of losing 
any one case among them all; the plaintiff’s attorney plays a role not unlike the defendant’s 
insurer, which leads to a level of risk adversity that is more in line with that of the defendants 
and likely to yield a fair settlement of the claim. 
 81. Id. 
 82. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (2003) (court determines fee in medical liability 
cases in Arizona); HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-15.5 (1993) (same in Hawaii). 
 83. See, e.g., M.C.R. § 8.121 (West 2003) (contingent fee not greater than one-third in 
medical liability cases in Michigan). 
 84. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-15.5 (1993) (providing that either party may request 
that attorney fees are subject to court approval); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.005 (West 
1988) (providing that any party charged with attorney’s fees in any tort action may request a 
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imposing a scale on fees that is intended to influence particular 
litigation behavior.85 For example, a statute like California’s lessens 
the percentage an attorney receives in a medical malpractice case as 
the amount of recovery increases.86 Medical malpractice litigation is 
more difficult than the ordinary tort case in that often liability is 
unclear and there are significant costs entailed in litigation.87 Even 
without tort reform in place, the substantive difficulty and the 
monetary outlay for experts tends to reduce interest in representing 
clients with lower damages and less fee potential, thus denying 
plaintiffs in that situation a ready means of litigating disputes.88 Once 
fee constraints are added, a rational attorney in California may well 
decide not to undertake medical malpractice cases at all, particularly 
given the lack of fee constraints in other types of personal injury 
cases.89 Ironically, a statute like California’s, which scales fees down 
as the amounts recovered get higher, may make higher damage cases 
less desirable as well.  
Tort reform of contingent fees clearly influences attorneys’ 
decisions about which cases to take, which in turn has major 
 
determination of reasonableness by the court). 
 85. See, e.g., N.J. R.C.R. 1:21-7 (West 1996), which establishes a schedule of maximum 
percentages that can be charged unless prior approval of the court is obtained. The schedule 
applies to any claim for damages based on tort and includes a special provision to increase fees 
payable by minors or incompetent persons to 25% in cases settling for less than $50,000.  
 86. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003). In upholding the constitutionality of 
this provision, the California Supreme Court explained that the legislature believed this scale 
reducing the attorneys’ fee as damages climb would induce plaintiffs to agree to a lower 
settlement, since the plaintiff would obtain the same net recovery from the lower amount. Roa 
v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal.3d 920 (1985). 
 87. KRITZER, supra note 78, at 81 (discussing the practices of attorneys in case study). 
 88. Hyman & Silver, supra note 6, at 1117. 
 89. A recent article in the ABA Journal indicates that Texas’s extensive package of tort 
reform has led to steep reductions in medical malpractice litigation. Between 1997 and 2002, 
the average number of cases filed was 435, in 2004 only 204 cases were filed, and in 2005 there 
were 256. Those who continue to file medical malpractice cases have sustained huge losses in 
income. Tort reform proponents state that more doctors have applied for licensure in Texas 
since the reforms. A Texas consumer group indicates areas of the state with large indigent or 
Medicaid-dependent populations continue to lack the access to physicians they need, despite 
these supposed increases. Terry Carter, Tort Reform Texas Style, 92 ABA JOURNAL 33–34 (Oct. 
2006). Professor Kritzer’s study similarly indicated the caution with which attorneys approach 
malpractice claims; in three months of observation of three practices, not one retainer for 
medical malpractice was signed. KRITZER, supra note 78, at 87. Professor Baker’s studies and 
others discussed in his book indicate that there is an epidemic of medical malpractice, not of 
malpractice lawsuits. BAKER, supra note 7, at 22–36.  
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implications for potential plaintiffs hoping to obtain legal 
representation. The effects of fee limits are magnified if a plaintiff 
injured by medical malpractice lacks health insurance or has 
inadequate coverage. For such individuals, a personal injury recovery 
may be the only means to finance desperately needed ongoing care.90 
Unless liability is so clear that the insurance carrier or defense 
attorney authorizes immediate payments as part of a defendant’s 
liability coverage, expenses for present treatment for personal injuries 
must be borne by the individual, and future care will be contingent on 
recovering through the tort system or qualifying for benefits under a 
social welfare provision. Because the uninsured will not necessarily 
qualify for even the limited benefits available to the poorest 
Americans, there is a realistic possibility that they will be unable to 
afford medical care.91 A fee scale like California’s, which arguably 
disadvantages the severely injured, has even more devastating effects 
when one realizes that high damages probably reflect the greatest 
need for expensive care.  
To be clear, some reforms of the contingent fee structure may not 
disadvantage those who need access to the tort system, and they 
might even benefit plaintiffs as a class.92 It is also true that a lack of 
willing attorneys has a negative impact on insured plaintiffs as well, 
but the problem with a statute like California’s is that it creates extra 
burdens for those who lack access to the type of health care and 
services they need and whose only chance of obtaining help is 
through litigation.  
 
 90. Emergency care may be provided on credit on a provisional basis, but ongoing 
treatment requires funding, through insurance or other means, such as qualification for social 
welfare programs. See supra note 10. 
 91. It is estimated that the uninsured forgo between $65 and $130 billion a year in medical 
treatments, and that 18,000 more uninsured adults ages 25–64 die than insured adults in the 
same age range. Mortality is 5–15% higher among the uninsured. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra 
note 11, at 233. 
 92. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without 
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 115 (1989). Professor Brickman, a strong critic 
of contingency fees as currently used, proposed that a standardized retainer agreement be filed 
with the court at the onset of the professional relationship. This form would list various pieces 
of information that would help clients and the court understand whether there actually was any 
risk of nonrecovery in the litigation and how much the attorney is being paid for assuming that 
risk. Id. 
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2. Caps on Noneconomic Harm 
Though noneconomic damages, which include pain, suffering, and 
loss of enjoyment of life, are a source of controversy, their 
curtailment through tort reform may jeopardize uninsured 
individuals’ ability to obtain legal representation and pay for health 
care. Critics of these damages question whether they do anything to 
restore an injured person to health.93 Even if one is willing to 
acknowledge that pain is an injury that should be compensated 
regardless of the effectiveness of money to reduce the pain, there is 
still the issue of how a jury should determine the amount of an award. 
There is a disturbing possibility that similarly situated individuals 
will recover vastly different amounts based on the jury’s inability to 
anchor the recovery to something solid.94 In some counties, 
variability of awards from plaintiff to plaintiff is reduced by the 
consistency of having judges, rather than juries, determine what 
should be awarded.95 Published ranges of prior awards that give 
judges guidance as to amount are also a possibility to eliminate the 
potential differential in compensation among similarly situated 
plaintiffs.96  
In the United States, the most common technique to limit 
noneconomic harm is the imposition of a cap.97 Tort reform 
 
 93. The classic article is Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 222 (1953) (“To put a monetary value on the unpleasant 
emotional characteristics of experience is to function without any intelligible guiding 
premise.”); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of 
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 165 (2004) (comparing awards of pain and suffering, and their 
acknowledged use to satisfy attorneys’ fees, to the fable of the emperor’s new clothes and 
urging their abolition). King would, instead, make attorneys’ fees recoverable for prevailing 
plaintiffs. Id. 
 94. King, supra note 93, at 175–77 (discussing the difficulties jurors confront trying to 
determine awards). 
 95. Sebok, supra note 54, at 387 (juries are hardly used in any European civil justice 
system). 
 96. Professor Sebok describes various methods by which European judges may determine 
damages, other than testimony at trial. There are “brackets” or ranges of damages set up by an 
independent body in England, while, in Germany, private groups publish biannual summaries 
of reported personal injury awards. France and Italy require parties to present their cases in 
terms of a standardized point system. Id. at 389. See also BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., 
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN ENGLISH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN LAW (2005). 
 97. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1071 (well over half of the states have enacted some type of 
damage cap). 
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legislation imposing caps on noneconomic harm, whether in all tort 
cases or in certain types, removes the possibility that a jury will 
award a huge amount of damages for pain and suffering.98 Caps have 
the ancillary effect of making cases less attractive to attorneys 
because the prospects for a high contingent fee are so limited.99 
Undoubtedly, caps also lower the settlement value of cases, an 
important factor since most cases will never go to trial. There are 
many objections to caps: the arbitrariness of whatever amount is 
selected, the seeming inequality of capping in certain areas of tort law 
and not in others, and the broader issue of whether caps disadvantage 
the most grievously injured.100 Caps as a tool of tort reform fail to 
address the crucial issue of whether intangible harm should be 
recoverable at all or whether a proposal like professor King’s to 
substitute attorneys’ fees for pain and suffering is a plausible 
alternative.101 Yet caps continue to be viewed as a panacea by states. 
Their impact on the un- and underinsured is notable and exacerbated 
by courts’ refusal to grapple with the holes pain and suffering 
damages must plug in cases brought by those who lack access to 
health care. 
The impact of caps on the uninsured and the poor is significant 
because, ironically, noneconomic damages serve several important 
purposes unrelated to actual compensation for pain and suffering.102 
 
 98. California was the first state to enact a cap and did so as part of its medical 
malpractice reform package (MICRA), CAL. CIV. Code § 3333.2 (West 1997). Texas also has 
enacted a $250,000 cap in medical malpractice cases but excludes hospitals from it. TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005). Colorado has a cap of $250,000 applicable 
in all cases unless the plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the award should be 
higher, and then it cannot exceed $500,000. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a). See 
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 715–16. 
 99. ABA JOURNAL, supra note 89, at 30.  
 100. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 6 at 1087 (caps on non-economic damages and 
attorneys’ fees will not reform the tort system and will worsen the problem of under-
compensation by limiting the remedies available to patients with serious injury). 
 101. See King, supra note 93.  
 102. These are not revealed to the jury and are rarely acknowledged by courts, but they 
unquestionably affect the practice of personal injury representation. The California Supreme 
Court acknowledged the relationship between attorneys’ fees and other related issues in Helfend 
v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (1970) (“[G]enerally the jury is not informed that the 
plaintiff’s attorney will receive a large portion of the plaintiff’s recovery in contingent fees or 
that personal injury damages are not taxable to the plaintiff and are normally deductible by the 
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Generally they buffer the plaintiff against the vagaries of damage 
awards. For example, although economic damages sound as though 
they would be fairly fixed and straightforward, they often present 
challenging issues on which jurors may disagree.103 If a jury awards 
less in lost wages or future medical costs than the plaintiff really 
needs, recovery of the noneconomic damages can help bridge the 
gap. In some cases, the noneconomic damages award is the major 
item of recovery, particularly in cases where the plaintiff has little to 
show for lost earnings or future lost wages. This is not uncommon 
where a plaintiff is elderly, unemployed, or out of the work force for 
a period of time, for example, as a student or a stay-at-home 
parent.104  
Another purpose of the noneconomic damage award is that it 
allows a plaintiff to pay the attorney the amount of the contingent fee 
without dipping into the money needed for medical care, lost wages 
and future economic harm.105 Without this subsidy, the attorney’s fee 
consumes some of what the plaintiff presumably needs to be made 
whole.106 
Like limitations on the contingent fee, caps have a particularly 
devastating effect on plaintiffs who lack health insurance or have 
inadequate coverage and therefore incur large out-of-pocket expenses 
or long-term costs associated with disability. Even if a settlement 
offer or a jury verdict calculates all of the economic damages 
accurately and favorably to the plaintiff, after the deduction of the 
contingent fee, no money may remain for health-related costs. For a 
person without health insurance, this may mean forgoing needed care 
or the assistance required to live at home. The more devastating the 
injury and the higher the damages, the less the capped noneconomic 
 
defendant. Hence, the plaintiff rarely actually receives full compensation for his injuries as 
computed by the jury. 
 103. Wholly apart from intangibles such as how the jury perceives the plaintiff, there are 
questions about how much medical care will cost in the future, whether inflation is being 
anticipated accurately, how far the plaintiff would progress in a career, what the plaintiff would 
earn in the future, etc. 
 104. ABA JOURNAL, supra note 89, at 30, 33. 
 105. See King, supra note 93, at 207–08. 
 106. In addition, since a reduced recovery will mean a lower attorney’s fee, some cases 
requiring extensive work and large expense may not be brought. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 
1072. 
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harm subsidizes the attorney’s fee. Thus, although fully insured 
plaintiffs may feel the effect of the loss of the subsidy, the people 
who will suffer most are the uninsured and the underinsured.  
3. The Collateral Source Rule 
At first blush, the collateral source rule107 would seem not to 
affect the uninsured at all as an uninsured person does not have 
collateral sources on which to draw. Thus, one might think this is an 
area where tort reform could proceed without concern about 
distributional impact. I include the topic to exemplify the point that a 
society comprised of insured and uninsured persons makes it much 
more difficult to develop simple and efficient systemic reforms. The 
collateral source rule was one aspect of the tort system Schwartz 
thought about in particular depth in his 1994 article. Schwartz 
believed that, if a national health care system were enacted, common 
sense notions of fairness would dictate that the collateral source rule 
would have no place in the system.108 He acknowledged that, from a 
deterrence perspective, there might be a reason to retain some form of 
the rule, and thought further study should focus on whether 
subrogating rights in favor of the victim’s insurer against the 
tortfeasor would be useful.109 But, he predicted uniform availability 
of insurance might well lead to abandonment of the rule and he 
estimated tort awards might decrease by approximately 20%.110 
Schwartz’s vision of a simple elimination of the collateral source 
rule certainly has not come to pass.111 There is little uniformity or 
consistency in the states’ approach to reform. Most jurisdictions with 
tort reform in place have not abolished the collateral source rule 
 
 107. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1058 (“The traditional rule is that compensation from 
‘collateral sources’ is none of the defendant’s business and does not go to reduce the 
defendant’s obligation to pay damages, either in negligence or in strict liability cases.”). 
 108. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1346–47. 
 109. Id. at 1347. 
 110. Id. at 1349. 
 111. In fact, even in legal systems with universal health care, collateral source issues 
remain somewhat complex due to the need to distinguish among sources as to which a 
subrogation right exists in favor of the social security carrier and those as to which this is not 
applicable. See generally BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 96, at 171–96 (chapter on 
collateral sources and subrogation rights in English, German and Italian systems). 
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completely.112 Instead, they make a tortured series of distinctions 
among the sources of various benefits. Life insurance is different 
from public benefits, and public benefits differ from one another 
depending on their source. These are different from gratuitous 
services provided by relatives.113 Litigation over whether to consider 
a benefit as a collateral source is not uncommon.114 
Despite numerous critiques of the collateral source rule on 
efficiency and fairness grounds,115 the existence of uninsured persons 
makes it difficult to completely abolish it. One can readily see the 
value of precluding a double recovery in the case of a plaintiff who is 
receiving a payment from an insurance company, or even the 
inefficiency of shifting the loss from one insurance pool to another.116 
But a complete abolition of the rule would work hardship in certain 
cases. A common scenario is that of gratuitous services rendered by 
relatives. Many times the plaintiffs in these cases lack adequate 
insurance for custodial care, which relatives then provide. In these 
instances, relatives fill an essential gap and courts generally agree 
that it would be bad policy to exclude recovery from the defendant.117 
Hence, it is not possible to move toward the simplicity Schwartz 
envisioned, with its accompanying benefits, because the rule is 
needed by a percentage of the population in certain situations.  
 
 112. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1059 (describing the range of modifications reflected in tort 
reform statutes). 
 113. Id. at 1059–60 (explaining various sources of benefits, exemption of direct benefits, 
and difficulties in applying the rules). 
 114. See, e.g., Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 270, 295–96 (D.D.C. 
2003); McLean v. Runyon, 222 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2000); Amlotte v. United States, 
292 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924–31 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 115. See, e.g., 2 ALI STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 161–82 
(1991) (recommending abolition of the collateral source rule, except for life insurance). 
 116. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1059 (concluding it may be more efficient to achieve 
compensation without the collateral source rule). 
 117. See, e.g., Arambula v. Wells, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 587 (Cal. 1999) (stating that the 
majority of jurisdictions and many commentators do not think gratuitous benefits should reduce 
recovery); Estate of Fleming, 190 P.2d 611, 613 (Cal. 1948) (noting “charitable beneficences” 
benefit the state, which would otherwise directly or indirectly be providing the benefits). 
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4. Joint and Several Liability 
Joint and several liability is another example of a doctrine that, 
when modified, has a particularly large impact on those who lack 
access to health care. Tort reform proponents have attacked joint and 
several liability on the ground that it is a relic of the era preceding 
comparative fault and, as such, is a worthy candidate for 
extinction.118 Arguably, as comparative fault principles have 
permeated the tort system, it is odd and unfair to impose liability on a 
defendant who has been allocated a minimal percentage of 
responsibility by a jury.119 However, the historical purpose of 
protecting the plaintiff from the risk of a defendant’s insolvency or 
immunity120 remains valid because concern about the effect of 
insolvency of a defendant has not disappeared.  
Eighteen states have abolished joint and several liability 
completely,121 and in these states, a defendant will never be liable for 
more than her proportionate share of the damages. Even in a system 
where a plaintiff is insured, this may mean significant under-
compensation. For example, if fault is apportioned 30:70 among two 
defendants and the 70% defendant is insolvent, only 30% of the total 
damages awarded are recoverable by the plaintiff. This may mean 
that substantial future lost wages or sizeable awards of pain and 
suffering are simply unrecoverable. Where a plaintiff lacks medical 
insurance, the effect is even more pronounced. After payment of the 
attorneys’ fees and costs in a case, there may be an insufficient 
 
 118. The doctrine has been recognized since the 1700s. As originally adopted, when a 
plaintiff enforced a joint and several judgment entirely against one party, that party could not 
recover contribution from co-defendants. The rule evolved at a time when joint and several 
liability applied only to tortfeasors acting in concert to commit intentional torts, and thus, the 
denial of contribution was a way of refusing to allow an intentional tortfeasor to take advantage 
of an equitable loss-sharing doctrine. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 1078, 1085–86. 
 119. See id. at 1081 (explaining that today contribution is applicable on a comparative 
basis). 
 120. The effect was to provide the plaintiff with more than one source of funds but not 
more than one recovery. In addition to insolvency, a judgment may be unenforceable because a 
defendant has an immunity or partial immunity. Id. at 1078. 
 121. Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Is the “Crisis” in the Civil 
Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1148 (2005). See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 09.17.080 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Lexis Nexis 2005); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-1-109 (2005). 
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amount remaining to pay for basic medical expenses incurred already 
and needed in the future. Other states have adopted intermediate 
modifications.122 California and several other states retain joint and 
several liability for economic harm.123 That rule represents a better 
choice if uninsured plaintiffs are involved, but even then, given the 
vagaries of calculating economic loss, payment of attorneys’ fees and 
the loss of the subsidy noneconomic loss provides, a plaintiff may be 
unable to afford long term medical care.  
Admittedly, modifications of joint and several liability have an 
impact on virtually all tort plaintiffs, but a person with medical and 
disability insurance has a much better chance of returning to his pre-
accident status quo. Insured persons have access to the care needed to 
get back on their feet in terms of health and reentry into the work 
world. Although they may be worse off for the accident because they 
are unable to recover fully legitimate damages like future lost wages, 
their prospects are much better than those of the uninsured.  
5. Access to the System 
Statutes such as the Class Action Fairness Act124 and doctrines 
such as preemption, which increasingly displace state tort actions,125 
make cases harder and more expensive to litigate and accordingly 
create barriers for people who rely on the legal system to be made 
whole. With regard to the Class Action Fairness Act, the point was to 
make it more difficult to bring class actions that involve large 
amounts of money and persons or companies from different states.126 
 
 122. These include abolishing joint and several liability when the defendant’s comparative 
responsibility is below a certain level. See Hantler, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 121, at 1147–
50. 
 123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 2007).  
 124. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 125. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 504 (listing cases in many areas that were 
previously litigated as common law tort actions). 
 126. News Batch, http://www.newsbatch.com/tort.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). The 
statute results in revisions to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), which 
make it is much easier to satisfy the requirements of diversity of citizenship than in an ordinary 
diversity case. ROWE, SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 4, at 14. The statute also affects 
settlement of federal class actions by creating disincentives to engage in so-called “coupon 
settlements” by limiting attorneys fees awardable in such cases and in several other ways. Id. at 
17. 
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There has been increasing dismay over particular types of tort claims 
that fit this description, as they are thought to provide large pay-offs 
for attorneys and little for individual plaintiffs.127 While it may be 
wise to take steps to be sure consumers are not being exploited, the 
original purpose of a class action—enabling joint representation on 
claims too small or insignificant to litigate individually—may be 
undercut. In the end, the people who are displaced from the legal 
system are those without the funds to finance relief on their own.128 
Presumably, many uninsured persons fall in that group. 
Preemption displaces state courts and state tort law in numerous 
areas that have traditionally fallen within their province.129 To the 
extent federal statutes may not permit suits for damages, injured 
persons have no compensatory remedy.130 To the extent remedies are 
available, litigants must obtain an attorney with the requisite skill to 
litigate what has now become federal litigation. People with less 
access to legal representation will have less access to relief. 
In addition to realizing that statutes or doctrinal developments that 
limit access to relief have a particularly harsh impact on the 
uninsured or underinsured, it is worth noting that the need for access 
to the legal system, as reflected in the volume and composition of 
torts cases occupying the dockets of the courts, might well differ if 
there were universal health coverage. If health coverage coincided 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. STEPHEN M. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS O. MAIN, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, DOCTRINE, PRACTICE & CONTEXT 845 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the 
tensions inherent in class actions and questioning whether there are viable alternatives to 
collective representation to enforce safety, environmental, consumer protection and other 
standards). 
 129. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 919 (2005) (“because product safety is 
federally regulated to a large extent, widening the reach of the preemption doctrine erases more 
and more areas of products liability law”); FRANKLIN ET AL, supra note 5, at 504. See, e.g., 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (holding that a claim against a 
medical device producer was impliedly preempted by FDA statutes and regulatory scheme). 
 130. OWEN, supra note 129, at 49–50 (noting that a shift toward safety regulation in 
substitution of compensating injuries, as is the preference in Europe, may make sense in that it 
emphasizes prevention over deterrence but that Europe is much more inclined to regulation than 
the U.S., and less reliant on tort litigation to achieve deterrence and compensation). Owen 
cautions that efforts to protect the common good through federal regulation must not trample 
state law compensatory rights of persons injured by defective products, and he asserts there is 
no reason why product safety regulation and products liability litigation could not co-exist. Id. 
at 919. 
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with modifications such as elimination of the collateral source rule, 
low-damage cases that currently occupy time and consume resources 
and settlement dollars might become so unnecessary that plaintiffs 
would opt not to file.131 The rigors of litigation, including stress, loss 
of time, and costs, are not something one wants to endure for a very 
modest return, especially if the money is not needed for medical care. 
Litigation rates in countries with universal health care benefits are far 
lower than in the United States,132 and the awards are much 
smaller.133 Their legal systems differ enough from ours to make it 
difficult to find a causal relation between coverage and litigation 
rates, but it is not farfetched to think need plays a role in determining 
what gets litigated.134 
III. CHANGING THE FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSION 
The prior section demonstrates that some reforms of the common 
law system disadvantage people who must rely on the tort system to 
obtain care when injured by others. This realization places thoughtful 
critics of the tort system in a dilemma. Even if one recognizes flaws 
in the common law or believes it can be improved, such change 
 
 131. Hyman & Silver, supra note 6, at 1114 (citing studies indicating that health insurance 
reduces the incentive to sue, especially in jurisdictions that have abrogated the collateral source 
rule). 
 132. See, e.g., Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and 
Product Safety—Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a 
Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 307 (2000) (noting that American 
damage awards are higher than in Europe due to the lack of a social security system, high costs 
of medical treatment, lack of public healthcare services, generous pain and suffering awards, 
and punitive damages, and asserting that litigation is a surrogate for the European welfare 
state). 
 133. Professor Markesinis notes that American awards will invariably seem larger than 
they are in comparison with awards in other countries since many of the items in European and 
other systems are covered directly by the state or other social security carriers. MARKESINIS, 
supra note 96, at 202. 
 134. See, e.g., SIMON DEAKIN, ANGUS JOHNSTON & BASIL MARKESINIS, MARKESINIS & 
DEAKIN’S TORT LAW 621 (5th ed. 2003) (citing Anita Bernstein, A Duty to Warn: One 
American View of the EC Products Liability Directive, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 224 (1991)) 
(discussing the need for strict liability in the European Community as opposed to the United 
States and noting that interests of victims are arguably better served by health care and social 
insurance provisions than a system that loads costs on product producers and thus that strict 
liability of the American variety could be viewed as unnecessary and a diversion of economic 
resources from more worthwhile uses). 
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should not come at the expense of the group that actually needs the 
system to obtain care. This should lead to rejection of the idea that 
the tort system should, or even can, be fixed without regard to these 
individuals. However, in the current debate, the only other choice is 
to maintain an inefficient system to provide needed benefits for the 
16% of the population who lack them. There is no middle ground nor 
opportunity for nuanced discussion.  
Would it be possible to change the focus of the debate by 
acknowledging the impact of tort reform on the un- and under-
insured and working toward a solution where they need not rely on 
the tort system for basic medical care? A change of this magnitude 
would require educating lawmakers and stakeholders not only about 
the impact of certain tort reforms but also the costs associated with 
the U.S. health care system.135 With regard to the health care system, 
the good news is that although reform has been the subject of 
political wrangling for the better part of a century,136 there is now 
little debate that changes must be made.137 If nothing else, the high 
amount the U.S. spends on health care138 and its modest showing in 
statistical surveys of life expectancy and infant mortality139 should 
propel us in the direction of change.140 
 
 135. The United States spends more than any other developed nation on health care: 13.9% 
of its gross domestic product in 2000. Americans pay more out-of-pocket for health care than 
any other nation except Switzerland. See Hermer, supra note 8, at 60. 
 136. See, e.g., QUADAGNO, supra note 21 (tracing the policy debate regarding health 
insurance from the Progressive Era, commencing in the 1890s, to the present day). 
 137. Health care reform was front and center in the political campaigns of both John Kerry 
and George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 18, at 297. Then 
Senate majority leader Bill Frist, who is also a surgeon, told the National Press Club that “the 
status quo of health care delivery in this country is unacceptable today. It will further 
deteriorate unless the [health] care sector of 2004 is radically transformed, is re-created.” David 
S. Broder, Our Broken Health Care System, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at A21. 
 138. No other nation in the world spends as much as the U.S. Jost, supra note 8, at 546.  
 139. According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(“OECD”) statistics for 2006, the U.S. leads the world in health spending, but has an infant 
mortality rate above the OECD average. (6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births). Japan and the Nordic 
countries have a rate below 3.5. Life expectancy is also less than the OECD average. Org. for 
Econ. Dev. OECD Health Data, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/52/36960035.pdf.  
 140. In addition, the real bill for the prescription drug benefits passed by Congress under 
the Bush administration will be exorbitant. The White House deliberately misled Congress as to 
projected costs, and shortly after the President’s reelection it revised cost estimates from $400 
billion to $1.2 trillion over the decade from 2006 to 2015. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 18, at 298. 
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The only questions are what changes should be made, and how we 
should make them. In the 2004 election, John Kerry had a 
multifaceted plan that would have involved tax credits and 
government spending with projected costs of $895 billion dollars 
over ten years.141 George W. Bush’s plan involved refundable tax 
credits that would not have cost the government much but would 
have reached only two to three million of the 43 million Americans 
without health insurance.142 There were many objections to such a 
plan, and it appears to be dead.143 However, neither the Kerry plan 
nor the Bush plan is the last word on ways to reform the U.S. health 
care system. A copious amount of legal and nonlegal scholarship 
addresses the issues of whether the United States would benefit or 
suffer from guaranteed access to health care and how it could best be 
achieved if it were a goal worth pursuing.144 There is a vast amount of 
comparative data from countries all over the world.145 The challenge 
is to get stakeholders to take the steps necessary to implement a 
feasible plan. 
Scholars attribute the inability to take meaningful steps to reform 
health care to the strong vested interests in maintaining the status 
quo.146 This of course includes economic benefits that flow from the 
 
 141. Id. at 297. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Although the Bush administration argued that users would become more careful 
consumers if they had to pay the bills and that lower premiums on high-deductible plans would 
make insurance cheaper for uninsured people and small businesses, critics argued the plan 
would shift risks, costs, and the complex issues of health care reform to private individuals. Id. 
Other critics saw the plan as likely to produce tax savings for the rich and to worsen availability 
of quality health care for the middle class and poor. Hermer, supra note 8, at 49.  
 144. Hermer, supra note 8, at 78–79 (urging provision of primary basic health care to all 
Americans financed through taxes but not including catastrophic or specialty health coverage, 
which would be obtained separately through private insurance). The disabled, low-income, 
elderly and others would need a government entitlement for catastrophic and specialty 
coverage. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., Richard F. Southby, Is There Any Hope for Real Health Care Reform?, 32 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442 (2004) (focusing on the major characteristics of an ideal health care 
system and presenting comparative data); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They 
Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004) (discussing the two 
primary models found in the world and analyzing why our costs are so much higher.)  
 146. Marmor & Oberlander, supra note 48, at 212 (“. . . fundamental reform poses a 
tremendous threat to those institutions invested in maintaining the medical status quo. This 
includes a large proportion of U.S. hospitals and physicians. It includes almost all U.S. health 
insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and suppliers of medical equipment and technology.”). 
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system in place. Tort reform fits into the picture because it also 
affects the economic interests of stakeholders, and certain types of 
tort reform relate directly to major players in the health care debate, 
such as physicians, businesses, and consumers. The irony of the 
current stalemate is that positions of some stakeholders in the tort 
reform debate are inconsistent with their positions on health care 
reform. They do not perceive the inconsistency, perhaps because 
health care reform involves a much broader population than tort 
plaintiffs. Yet there is no doubt the issues are related. In his book on 
contingent fees, professor Herbert Kritzer notes the link, stating, 
“[t]he single change that would have the most impact on the need for 
a contingency fee representation would be the development of a 
[universal] health care system (particularly one that did not impose 
copays or deductibles for some or all accidental injuries).”147 
If, as others have observed, the entrenched interests see change as 
antithetical to their well-being, how can a solution be found? Public 
choice theory, described as the “dominant vision of political life in 
late twentieth-century America,”148 might indicate that this impasse 
merely exemplifies the private self-interest and public incoherence 
inherent in the democratic process and accordingly would suggest it 
is unlikely legislation could have any salutary effect. Jerry Mashaw 
describes the public choice vision of legislatures and bureaucracies as 
“downright depressing,” consisting principally of private groups who 
prefer to have social resources shifted from the general public to their 
members and politicians who support these groups.149 This seems an 
apt characterization of both the debates over health care reform and 
tort reform. 
Putting aside analytical or moral objections to a public choice 
model for the moment, it is possible to envision self-interest uniting 
some groups that are currently disconnected: physicians, businesses, 
labor, and consumers. Properly channeled, that self-interest could 
spur proposals that are economically advantageous as well as 
beneficial to a broader common good. There are other important and 
 
 147. KRITZER, supra note 78, at 268. 
 148. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE, USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (1997). 
 149. Id. at 15. 
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powerful groups—notably insurers and plaintiffs’ attorneys—whose 
self-interests would likely never coalesce with others’ on issues of 
tort or health care reform. Fortunately, unanimity is not required. 
A. Understanding the Positions of Major Interest Groups 
Physicians are a major force in issues of tort reform and health 
care reform. Although the health industry is broader, including 
hospitals, labs, pharmaceutical companies, and others involved in the 
delivery of care, physicians remain the most respected and visible 
representatives of a group with inconsistent positions. To the extent 
that the AMA represents physicians, the group has opposed reform to 
the traditional fee for service model of health care delivery since the 
early twentieth century.150 This opposition, motivated by fear that 
government intervention would inevitably lead to regulation of fees, 
used a multiplicity of arguments, ranging from interference with the 
doctor-patient relationship to the specter of socialism, communism, 
and incipient revolution.151  
Today, the AMA speaks with less authority than it did at one 
time,152 but its opposition to fundamental change remains. Although 
acknowledging the public health and economic burdens the uninsured 
cause, the AMA’s approach to change retains a strong endorsement 
of private health care financing, relying on monetary assistance to the 
uninsured in the form of tax credits and vouchers.153 Ideally, the $100 
billion annual federal subsidy for employment-based health insurance 
would be eliminated and there would be a subsidy through tax breaks 
to allow individuals to purchase healthcare.154 This echoes the Bush 
 
 150. QUADAGNO, supra note 21, at 7. There are, however, other physician groups that 
believe there must be a change in the delivery of medical services. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Richmond and Fein believe the AMA’s decline can be traced to its failure to engage in 
the process that led to passage of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s, a move that led policy 
makers in the public and private sector to be viewed as irrelevant. The AMA also failed to 
emerge as a force in the 1980s and 1990s, when power became concentrated in third party 
payers and the insurance industry. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 11, at 214–15. In 1972, 75% 
of all physicians belonged to the AMA, but in 1992 only 29% did. Id. at 216. 
 153. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HEALTH POLICY GROUP, EXPANDING 
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE AMA PROPOSAL FOR TORT REFORM, 2006, available at http://www. 
ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/ehi1012.pdf.  
 154. Id. at 9. 
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administration’s view that each person should select and pay for that 
individual’s own health care preferences.155 There are, however, 
physician groups that have declared their independence from the 
AMA on the issue of universal health care, making powerful 
arguments for change.156 
On the topic of tort reform, particularly in the medical malpractice 
context, the voices of physicians are much less muffled. There is 
particular concern about medical malpractice liability, even though 
according to professor Tom Baker, the threats are not nearly as large 
as they are perceived to be.157 Physicians attribute high insurance 
costs158 to the tort system, and they believe it fuels counterproductive 
practices, such as defense medicine, as well.159 
Consumers, meaning individuals who use both the health care 
system and the tort system, also have somewhat inconsistent 
positions. Many average Americans are unconvinced that health care 
reform would be a good thing, particularly if government is 
involved.160 They fear that change would imperil the quality of care 
 
 155. Id. at 20–21. 
 156. See Arnold S. Relman, Reforming the U.S. Health Care System: What the Legal & 
Medical Professions Need to Know, 15 HEALTH MATRIX: JOURNAL OF LAW-MEDICINE 423, 
427–28 (2005). Dr. Relman, professor emeritus of medicine at Harvard Medical School and 
former editor, New England Journal of Medicine, spoke against “consumer-directed” health 
care on the ground that it puts the greatest financial pressure on those with limited incomes and 
that it will not save very much because large health care costs will be covered by catastrophic 
insurance. He urged adoption of a single efficient insurance system that should be funded by an 
earmarked tax base to which employers contribute appropriately. He argues doctors must 
receive salaries rather than payment for piecework, and that physician group affiliations 
promote the best care for the premium dollar.) Id. The Physicians for a National Health 
Program (“PNHP”) are among the groups that have sprung up to fill the void left by the AMA. 
RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 11, at 216. 
 157. BAKER, supra note 7, at 68–92 (discussing research studies indicating there is far 
more medical malpractice than there are claims). In one study by Harvard researchers, 3% of 
patients found to have serious injury from malpractice brought suit. In a Chicago study, it was 
4%. Id. 
 158. Medical malpractice premiums have risen for certain specialties in certain areas since 
2000. Id. at 45.  
 159. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 11, at 208–09. Physicians complain that insurers 
sometimes settle claims that lack merit, thus injuring physicians’ reputations. They feel caught 
between pressure from HMOs and other insurers to hold down prices while at the same time 
being pressured to practice defensive medicine to reduce claims and litigation, or to be able to 
establish a defense against claims should they arise. Id. 
 160. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 18, at 29. Jerry Mashaw uses universal health insurance as an 
example of how our beliefs about whether an end is achievable or within our reach alter our 
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that the 80% of the population with health insurance now enjoys or 
that there will be long waits for service, worse diagnostic equipment, 
and higher taxes.161 Yet public opinion is also critical of the costs of 
health care, even when subsidized through employment, and there are 
many examples of individuals who have sought prescriptions or care 
in other countries because they were priced out of the market here.162 
Consumers’ positions may also be colored by a perception that 
those who lack insurance through an employer are unworthy of 
having it, that the uninsured have deliberately chosen not to pay into 
insurance plans their employer offers, or that they are not entitled to 
help because they are immigrants and noncitizens.163 These 
assumptions enable many Americans to sleep just fine at night 
regardless of the fact that others lack access to health care. In fact, 
none of these perceptions is true, but the public is not well educated 
about who lacks insurance.164 It is ironic that the American public, so 
 
view of its desirability. He quotes a former Bush administration official who stated, “national 
health insurance would combine the frugality of military procurement with the empathy of an 
IRS audit.” MASHAW, supra note 148, at 2. 
 161. See, e.g., Judith Feder, Crowd-out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 461, 462 (2004) (examining the potential disruption, both financially and in terms of the 
actual insurance benefits, that would result from a single-payer, or Medicare-for-all, system and 
explaining that Clinton’s strategy had been based on avoiding redistribution and private to 
public coverage shifts). 
 162. See, e.g., More Americans Seeking Surgery Abroad, CBS NEWS, Oct. 18, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/18/health/webmd/main2104425.shtml. This article 
describes trips by Americans to India, Thailand, and Singapore for surgery. People who cannot 
afford U.S. health insurance are increasingly willing to travel to hospitals outside the U.S. 
Ironically, some insured patients are also receiving treatment outside the U.S. and paying lower 
premiums. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Judith Feder, supra note 161, at 462. The simplest way to explain the 
nation’s political failure to enact universal coverage is that the “‘haves’ have health insurance; 
it’s the ‘have-nots’—or more precisely the have-nots deemed ‘undeserving’—who do not.” 
Feder contends the primary political and policy problem is that it is almost impossible to insure 
the “have-nots” without in some way disrupting the status quo of the “haves.” Id. But see Lisa 
Dubay, Christina Moylan & Thomas Oliver, Advancing Toward Universal Coverage: Are 
States Able to Take the Lead?, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1 (2004) (asserting that the 
American public agrees with the goal of universal coverage, but it remains elusive because of 
entrenched interests and disagreement over the means to achieve the goal). 
 164. See Rick Mayes, Universal Coverage and the American Health Care System in Crisis 
(Again), 7 J. HEALTH CARE L & POL’Y 242, 251 (2004). Mayes states that the uninsured 
population is a dynamic group. Id. at 249. It tends to be younger, have somewhat lower income, 
to be more likely to include persons who are members of a minority group, and to include 
people who work in service industries or are self-employed. Id. at 249–51. People often move 
in and out of insured status depending on their employment status, marital status, age, and 
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widely viewed as litigious to a fault, seems also to favor tort reform. 
This is possibly a product of media exaggeration and misstatement of 
torts issues.165 
Insurance companies, employers, and trade unions were all 
influential in assisting AMA efforts to derail earlier proposals for 
compulsory health insurance.166 Today, their interests seem to have 
diverged. Insurance companies remain firmly opposed to compulsory 
insurance and indeed to any change in the status quo.167 Insurance 
companies favor tort reform to the extent it saves money on what 
they must pay out in claims, but presumably they would not favor 
reform if it would replace the tort system and reduce or eliminate 
their source of profits.168 Business and labor169 both feel the impact of 
the extraordinary costliness of the American health care system. 
Indeed, labor disputes often center on the cost of health care.170 Thus, 
these groups should embrace change if it could be brought about at a 
lower cost than they are currently paying.171 Businesses are affected 
by litigation or threatened litigation and may therefore favor tort 
reform. 
 
income. Id. at 249. But even people who are employed and have insurance are often unable to 
cope with major health expenses, as is evidenced by the fact that nearly half of all bankruptcies 
involve a health expense problem and in one study of filings, 80% of the families filing had 
insurance. Id. at 251. David Himmelstein et al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as 
Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
content/full/hlthaff.w5.63/DC1. 
 165. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 6, at 462–63.  
 166. QUADAGNO, supra note 21, at 9. 
 167. Jost, supra note 8, at 438 (claiming that the commercial insurance and managed care 
lobby is the most important impediment to universal coverage); RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 
11, at 246 (stating that the political strength of insurance and for-profits in the health care 
industry has increased over the years). 
 168. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 6–10 (discussing conversations with CEOs in the 
insurance industry and noting the irony of an industry asking the government to reduce the 
demand for its product). 
 169. Labor unions were a strong force politically and financially in passage of Medicare. 
According to Richmond and Fein, they are not a constituency that could be organized to support 
universal health care today, both because the labor movement is far weaker than it was and 
because there is ambivalence as to whether labor would benefit. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 
11, at 247. 
 170. If one looks at health care expenditures already incurred on behalf of the uninsured, 
the total cost of offering universal health care should be less than a 3% increase. Id. at 233. The 
problem is that, while society should collectively benefit, individuals may doubt they would. Id. 
 171. If favorable collective bargaining agreements were in place, whether organized labor 
would view a new plan as equally advantageous would be questionable. Id. at 247. 
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Trial attorneys add yet another powerful dimension to the political 
mix. Their self-interests have to be in protecting against changes to 
the common law that affect the amount of recovery or the plaintiffs’ 
ability to collect it, because this is how they make their living. It is 
unlikely that any form of compromise, even if it produced traction on 
health care reform, would outweigh this interest.172 
B. Aligning the Interests by Broadening the Agenda 
Having examined the interests of various groups, it is apparent 
that there are some quid pro quos that could bring traditional 
opponents together if accompanied by accurate information about the 
issues. Physicians, for example, ought to favor this approach. Many 
physicians are enmeshed in health care bureaucracies that consume 
hours of administrative time to bill and collect money. They may 
receive underpayments from governmental agencies for some 
procedures and they are subject to rules and restrictions that interfere 
with their ability to serve patients to the extent many would like. At 
the same time, however, physicians are very concerned about medical 
malpractice premiums and the costs (monetary and emotional) of 
malpractice litigation. If physicians understood that some of the hard-
fought objections to particular types of tort reform would be less 
persuasive if there were an assurance that injured parties would have 
access to health care, and that this access would benefit their own 
practices, perhaps they would, as a political force, push their 
leadership in a different direction.173 
Consumers as a group ought to favor health care reform, even if 
they are not altruistic enough to worry about the fate of those who 
 
 172. Professor Kritzer observes that, while lawyers who depend on contingency fees are 
strong defenders of the current system, they also see themselves as defenders of victims and 
protectors of future victims. Changes to the system could be made that could conceivably 
preserve the public service contingent-fee lawyers provide while addressing objections to 
contingent fee representation. They would likely be opposed not only by the plaintiffs’ bar but 
also by corporate interests that would fear an increase in claims if more competition were 
introduced into the market for legal services. KRITZER, supra note 78, at 268–69. 
 173. See Marmor & Oberlander, supra note 48, at 226 (arguing that progressive voters 
favoring universal coverage must enlist physicians as allies). Given physicians’ discontent with 
their increasing lack of clinical authority and unhappiness over corporate domination of 
medicine, they may see participation in a public heath system as beneficial. Id. 
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lack coverage. As purchasers of insurance, most consumers would 
clearly benefit if costs could be lowered and services delivered 
efficiently. The extent to which it would be in consumers’ interest to 
accept tort reform as a quid pro quo would depend on whether access 
to health services included care for long-term disability and other 
benefits that now are often available only by instituting a lawsuit. 
Consumer support would also depend on what form the reform took. 
However, the legal and psychological benefits consumers would gain 
from health care reform ought to mean there is less need to invoke 
tort remedies. There might be some changes to the legal system that 
are indeed beneficial or simply uncontroversial.174 But like physicians 
and the AMA, consumers will have to realize that their true interests 
may diverge from that of the consumers’ attorneys—which is by far 
the largest and most powerful group acting on their behalf. 
Employers and businesses should certainly be in favor of health 
care reform. They already are enmeshed in the problems inherent in 
the delivery of health care through employers. They face increasingly 
expensive commitments to employees and the prospect of an 
unhappy and uncompetitive workforce if benefits are cut. They 
participate in subsidizing the costs associated with the uninsured. 
Any means that could be taken to simplify the system should be 
welcomed. If, as a subsidiary benefit, people would have less need 
and incentive to litigate because they would have greater access to 
care, businesses and employers should embrace a change. They are 
common defendants in tort cases. 
C. Considering the Common Good 
Thus far, I have argued that the self-interests of major stakeholder 
groups ought to enable them to see the links between the tort system 
and the health care problem. Opponents of public choice theory 
 
 174. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 78, at 263–65 (considering ways to design a system that 
would still permit access but reduce contingency fees, including opening the market so that 
some cases might be handled by claims brokers such as private insurance adjusters who could 
negotiate on behalf of the consumer in cases with clear liability and damages beyond policy 
limits); Weiler, supra note 7, at 216–21 (proposing damages reforms including guidelines for 
pain and suffering, rather than caps, reform of attorneys’ fees, and a collateral source offset 
enacted as a package).  
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might worry that by encouraging policy choices that maximize the 
self-interest of these already-powerful groups, we declare that the 
democratic process is an “abject failure” and give these players an 
excuse to use the market to transform “private greed into social 
progress and harmony.”175 Steven Kelman has argued that “cynical 
descriptive conclusions about behavior in government threaten to 
undermine the norm prescribing public spirit.”176 However, even 
public choice theorists do not believe economic self-interest is the 
sole motive in political behavior.177 It is certainly not my intent to 
endorse an abandonment of action in the public interest, but rather to 
acknowledge the role entrenched interests have played in both the tort 
and health reform contexts and to suggest that self-interest might cut 
in favor of change rather than against it. As Mashaw concluded after 
a careful examination of public choice and interest group theories, 
legislators and politicians sometimes pursue things that seem to be in 
the public interest with character and conviction, giving credence to 
the ideal of civic virtue and public spirit.178 What makes the analysis 
difficult is that most legislation is likely to be explained as what is 
good for the majority, as well as a benefit to certain interests.179 
There are moral and ethical reasons to believe that basic 
healthcare is essential in our society, and without a doubt, many 
groups of physicians, consumers, labor representatives and employers 
believe the same. Yet this belief has not been enough to fuel change. 
Even absent bad faith or unmitigated self-interest, change in this area 
has been very difficult to effectuate. Observers of public policy and 
politics have attributed part of the stalemate concerning health care 
reform to the incrementalism by which changes to the health care 
 
 175. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical 
and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 202 (1988) 
(describing critique of the theory). 
 176. Steven Kelman, Public Choice and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INT. 93–94 (1987). 
 177. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for 
the “Nobel” Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1988) (authors, including Nobel Prize winner 
Buchanan, characterizing their position as a belief that narrow self-interest is a significant 
motive and explaining that they categorically reject the view that promotion of the “public 
interest” is a satisfactory model for the behavior of political agents). 
 178. MASHAW, supra note 148, at 37. 
 179. Id. at 38. 
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system have occurred.180 Once programs are in place, such as 
Medicare or prescription drug benefits, changes become extremely 
difficult. Reforming the tort reform agenda by squarely and honestly 
placing the lack of health care on the table might have the benefit of 
changing the dynamic enough to get major interest groups to break 
from their hardened positions. Their commitment to the public good 
will also be necessary to carry them forward, as it is clear some of 
these stakeholders can win their campaign for tort reform in certain 
states and would not have to take other considerations into account. 
The best chance for success occurs when physicians, consumers, 
employers, and business persons break free of the interest groups that 
purport to speak for them and confront the issue as individuals: as 
voters and as users of both the health care system and the tort system. 
It is then that they will realize their common interests and force a 
change.181 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The portrait of the tort system painted by politicians is often 
inaccurate and incomplete. Their efforts to push a tort reform agenda 
justifiably raise suspicions. This is unfortunate, because there are 
many insightful and thoughtful proposals about how to improve the 
tort system. Even if one were disposed to view some of these 
suggestions in a positive light, the presence of millions of uninsured 
individuals whose access to health care would be impacted makes it 
 
 180. See, e.g., TED MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 173–75 (2d ed. 2000) (stating 
that the focus on the indigent and elderly as the first steps toward publicly funded health care 
have made broader reform harder, not easier, to achieve); Dubay et al., supra note 163, at 3 
(discussing how the incrementalist perspective, which results in public policy that is remedial 
rather than proactive and focuses on current discrete problems rather than reaching more 
fundamental policy goals, can have the positive result of learning through making small 
changes or it can stifle policy innovation). 
 181. There are signs that this kind of coalition is taking place. Immediately after President 
Bush’s 2007 State of the Union address, physicians, registered nurses, and patients were 
convening to promote H.R. 676, the United Sates National Insurance Act, which is being 
reintroduced in the new Congress by Representatives John Conyers and Dennis Kucinich. 
Labor organizations also have indicated support. Press Release, Physicians for a National 
Health Program, Nurses, Doctors, Patients Respond to Bush Health Proposals, Unite in Call for 
Real Universal Health Care, Press Release (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.pnhp.org/ 
news/2007/january/nurses_doctors_pat.php. 
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very difficult to accept changes. Although pro-reform advocacy 
groups speak in broad generalities, much tort reform affects insured 
persons differently than the uninsured. It is only by looking at the 
link between tort reform and the uninsured that a comprehensive 
understanding of the system emerges. Universal access to health care 
would not eliminate the inequalities between the haves and have-nots, 
but it would make the impact of certain tort reform measures much 
clearer and minimize potentially devastating effects. Reforming the 
tort reform agenda might lead major stakeholders in society to see the 
benefits in addressing both of these issues, resulting in public policy 
that is moderate, rational, and effective. 
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